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NATO: CAN THE ALLIANCE BE SAVED?

REPORT

OF

SENATOR SAM NUNN

TO THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D.C., May 13, 1982.

Hon. JOHN TOWER,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: During the timeframe January 3 to January 14, 1982, I traveled to Europe to examine the current political and military situation with respect to the NATO Alliance. I reported to the committee on a similar trip in 1974 in my report, "Policy, Troops and the NATO Alliance," and again in 1977 with the late Senator Dewey Bartlett in "NATO and The New Soviet Threat."

I visited with political and military leaders as well as civilian experts in several of the major NATO countries. In addition, I met with representatives of the European Community and a large number of the NATO representatives in Brussels. I spent a considerable amount of time with General Bernard Rogers at SHAPE Headquarters discussing the military problems and other issues facing the Alliance. Prior to departing and after my return, I had numerous discussions and briefings with Defense and State Department personnel, U.S. civilian experts, and the NATO diplomatic community and parliamentarians.

I am indebted to the work of several civilian experts, Dr. Joseph V. Braddock, Mr. Donald R. Cotter and Dr. Fred Wikner, for their valuable contributions. Dr. Tom Callaghan, a recognized expert on Alliance cooperation, has provided valuable advice. I am also grateful for the advice of Lieutenant General James F. Hollingsworth (Ret.) and Dr. Jeffrey Record, both of whom also assisted with the preparation of the 1977 NATO report.

Finally, I would like to thank the staff that accompanied me on the trip and worked on the report: Mr. Frank Sullivan of the Armed Services Committee and Mr. Arnold Punaro of my staff. Kathy Parkerson of my office deserves much credit for her excellent work in preparing the report for printing.

I am hopeful that this report will be of interest and benefit to the members of our committee as we consider matters relating to the NATO Alliance.

Sincerely,

SAM NUNN.

CONTENTS

	Page
Letter of Transmittal	III
Background	1
A fragile and political foundation	1
The heart of NATO's problem	2
Conventional defense—the NATO dilemma	3
Is a credible conventional defense possible?	4
The Army-Air Force initiative	4
The Soviet-Warsaw Pact achilles heel?	5
NATO opportunity—new technology and new doctrine	6
Can new doctrine change old procurement habits?	6
A compatible European idea	7
NATO political leaders role	7
Is a credible conventional defense affordable?	7
Integration and interoperability are indispensable	8
NATO-Warsaw Pact military balance—where does the money go?	9
The U.S. example	9
The growing nuclear controversy	10
Is "No First Use" a responsible posture	11
Major changes in nuclear posture needed	11
The conventional horse must be in front of the nuclear cart	11
Recommendations	12
I. Credible conventional defense	12
II. Change nuclear posture	13
III. Freeze U.S. forces and expenditures	13
IV. Cooperative defense industral effort	14
V. Monitor Western credits	14

NATO: CAN THE ALLIANCE BE SAVED?

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization today faces multiple problems which, if left unresolved, could destroy the Alliance as a credible collective security organization. NATO remains wedded to a military strategy—flexible response and forward defense—whose viability has been severely compromised by profound changes in the global and European military environment. NATO's political cohesion, the essential foundation for needed alterations in the Alliance's military posture, has been badly shaken by external influences and internal disagreements.

The NATO Alliance is now in need of major repair, militarily, politically, and economically. Western political leaders must begin to make these repairs soon if the NATO shield is to continue to protect Western values and interests.

A FRAGILE NATO POLITICAL FOUNDATION

Prospects for achieving desirable alterations in NATO's military force posture and strategy hinge on obtaining a level of political consensus within the Alliance that NATO unfortunately does not enjoy today. Politically, the Alliance is in disarray over a host of issues—a disarray evident in bickering among the allies and in a lack of unified responses to Soviet international behavior. Charges and countercharges are frequently hurled across the Atlantic.

On East-West relations, the Europeans charge the United States with being more interested in confronting the Soviets than keeping peace, and they fear being dragged into war. The United States charges the Europeans with being more interested in economic dealings with the East than the security of their own people, and it fears a European drift to neutralism. The United States contends that a considerable amount of Western European-Soviet bloc trade is significantly subsidized with Western credits and guarantees. The Europeans believe the United States is too sanctimonious and self-serving in efforts to restrict European trade with Eastern Europe while continuing to sell United States grain to Moscow.

On the Middle East, the Europeans charge the United States with seeking a military posture and presence in the Middle East without any overall military goals or political strategy. The United States charges the Europeans with military timidity and inaction in the face of palpable Soviet threats to oil supplies upon which Europe is far more dependent than the United States.

On the Third World, the Europeans charge the United States with overemphasizing military solutions to Third World problems while ignoring the fundamental economic and social problems. The United States charges Europeans with insufficient attention to direct military problems caused by Soviet and Soviet proxy attempts to support the violent overthrow of non-Communist governments in unstable Third World countries.

On burden-sharing, the Europeans charge the United States with neglecting NATO defense during Viet Nam and its aftermath while they were improving NATO defenses and now hammering the allies to do more in difficult economic times. They also criticize the quality of the All-Volunteer Force and question United States abilities to produce reserves in the event of NATO conventional war. The United States charges the Europeans with not accepting a large enough defense spending burden in the face of a large Soviet military buildup.

On the two-way procurement street, Europeans charge the United States with reneging on agreements to procure common equipment and weapons from Europe. The United States charges the Europeans with insufficient interest in NATO standardization and interoperability resulting from national pressures to protect domestic industries.

The disturbing aspect of these charges and counter charges is that both sides are to a growing extent correct. If NATO is to succeed, the discussion must move in the direction of reconciling the real differences and of positive coordination and cooperation.

THE HEART OF NATO'S PROBLEM—A MILITARY STRATEGY THAT CANNOT BE IMPLEMENTED

NATO's military strategy has been characterized as one of flexible response and forward defense. Flexible response has implied the use of tactical and/or strategic nuclear weapons in the event of a Soviet-Warsaw Pact conventional attack in Europe could not be contained by non-nuclear means. Forward defense has meant defense as near to the inter-German border as possible, with the aim of conceding minimum West German territory. This strategy was adopted at a time when NATO possessed pronounced strategic and theater nuclear advantages over the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. NATO's quantitative inferiority in conventional forces deployed in or readily available for combat in Europe was deemed tolerable because nuclear superiority permitted the Alliance to escalate a conflict across the nuclear threshold to the disadvantage of the Pact.

During the past decade and a half, however, the Soviet Union has managed to eliminate NATO's nuclear superiority at both the strategic and theater levels, while at the same time expanding its traditional advantages in conventional forces.

By attaining strategic nuclear parity with the United States, the Soviet Union has severely undermined the credibility of U.S. strategic nuclear forces as a deterrent to a conventional attack on Europe. By deploying theater nuclear forces that are now superior to NATO's, the Soviet Union has reduced the effectiveness of NATO's tactical nuclear forces both as an instrument for defeating a massive non-nuclear invasion and as a deterrent to Soviet use of nuclear weapons. By enhancing its longstanding quantitative superiority over NATO in conventional forces with greatly improved quality, the Soviet Union has diminished the prospects for a successful forward defense.

Under conditions of strategic parity and theater nuclear inferiority, a NATO nuclear response to non-nuclear Soviet aggression in Europe would be a questionable strategy at best, a self-defeating one at worst. Thus major responsibility for continued deterrence in Europe has shifted to NATO's outnumbered, outgunned and maldeployed conventional forces. Flexible response in theory has become inflexible response in practice.

The United States loss of strategic nuclear superiority, which many observers regarded as inevitable, was not in and of itself fatal to NATO's flexible response strategy. Had the demise of strategic superiority been attended by retention of theater nuclear advantages and by creation of conventional defenses unambiguously capable of mounting an effective forward defense of Germany, the basic integrity of NATO's strategy could have been preserved. During the 1970s, however, the Alliance chose to rely for the most part on the aging theater nuclear weapons deployed in the late 1950s and the early 1960s. Despite mounting evidence that the Soviet Union was mustering in Eastern Europe the capacity for a conventional blitzkrieg (thereby reducing the degree of warning time so essential for a successful forward defense), NATO's conventional defense posture vis-a-vis the Soviet-Warsaw Pact was allowed to deteriorate further.

CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE—THE NATO DILEMMA

Thus as NATO enters the 1980s, it confronts a military environment characterized by strategic nuclear parity, growing theater nuclear inferiority, and a continuing lack of a credible conventional capability. Not even the full realization of NATO's Long-Range Theater Nuclear Force modernization program, essential to the re-creation of a credible deterrent to a Soviet first-use of nuclear weapons in Europe, will restore credibility to NATO nuclear deterrence of conventional Soviet aggression.

In 1974, I reported on NATO's conventional and nuclear defense problems and sponsored several amendments designed to stimulate corrective action. In 1977, the late Senator Dewey Bartlett and I questioned NATO's ability to implement its military strategy. An increasing number of Europeans, including some military leaders, are doing so now.

There is a wide agreement in the Alliance that it would be desirable to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons and to strengthen NATO's conventional forces as a means of deterring non-nuclear Soviet aggression in Europe. This slowly emerging consensus runs across the political spectrum—from defense-oriented conservatives to more responsible segments of the anti-nuclear movement. Simultaneously, however, there is a widespread resistance to changing NATO's military strategy because the strategy is politically sensitive and because there is no apparent substitute available. Thus, despite misgivings and growing apprehensions about NATO's existing military strategy, there is a great reluctance on the part of Europeans to rethink it.

One must ask why NATO countries do not use this growing concern as a catalyst for change to build a credible conventional defense. The answer is twofold. First, the conventional force gap between NATO and the Warsaw Pact has been described as so large for so long that a viable conventional defense is believed by many to be hopeless. Second, the cost of matching Warsaw Pact forces one for one—in tanks, troops, artillery and aircraft—is seen as prohibitive, particularly under current economic conditions.

NATO is thus faced with a dilemma: there is a growing consensus that less reliance should be placed on use of nuclear weapons in response to a conventional Warsaw Pact attack, but there is a wide-

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spread feeling that a viable non-nuclear defense is not attainable. This paradox, coupled with political and economic differences within the Alliance, is causing frustration in America and is threatening the very fabric of the Alliance itself.

Some have suggested that we simply pull U.S. troops out of Europe in order to punish our NATO allies. As satisfying as this might be as a vehicle for expressing American frustration, it is a recipe for the destruction of NATO and for a neutralized Western Europe. Though some believe these proposals are a means of compelling the Europeans to do more, if implemented, they are likely to do the opposite by strengthening the very political forces in Europe that now oppose NATO. Those who suggest Europe alone has the resources to muster a viable conventional defense—while this has considerable theoretical long-term appeal—should first answer a parallel question: Can an Alliance without American conventional forces be expected to provide a credible conventional defense when the Alliance with American forces thus far has failed?

The principal challenge that President Reagan and his NATO counterparts face at the June Summit Conference is to identify politically sustainable changes that offer the Western Alliance hope for a credible deterrent and a viable defense with available resources in the decade ahead. If this challenge is not met soon, the future of the Alliance itself will be in grave jeopardy.

IS A CREDIBLE CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE POSSIBLE?

Whether Europe is conventionally defensible against a massive non-nuclear Warsaw Pact attack has for decades been a subject of discussion within the Alliance. Today this question has become critical. As the credibility of NATO's strategic and theater nuclear deterrent against conventional attack declines, the importance of a credible conventional deterrent grows. Conventional deterrence depends on a viable conventional defense. Some defense analysts and military leaders now believe that a credible conventional defense is possible through a number of new initiatives. Those suggested initiatives include exploitation of new technologies, adoption of new operational doctrines and better utilization of Europe's substantial reserves of trained manpower for territorial defense.

THE ARMY—AIR FORCE INITIATIVE

One new initiative receiving attention in American military circles is the U.S. Army's work in progress on a new conventional defense doctrine known as "Airland Battle." The "Airland Battle" concept proposes changing the way a conventional defense of Europe would be conducted by using inherent NATO military strengths to exploit fundamental Warsaw Pact weaknesses.

The senior Army commanders, including Chief of Staff Meyer, General Vessey, General Starry, and General Otis, deserve credit for their leadership and innovative work in this area. General Bernard Rogers, NATO Supreme Commander, is beginning to develop some of these concepts for use. General Lew Allen and the senior Air Force leaders of the Air Force Council have reviewed the "Airland Battle"

concept and are to be commended for aggressively evaluating the key Air Force role in this doctrine.

According to U.S. Army experts, the essence of this new military doctrine is a more effective and innovative utilization of existing forces and new technologies to exploit vulnerabilities in Soviet doctrine would give emphasis to the attack of all Warsaw Pact echelons. For the first time, this doctrine points to the need to attack the follow-on, reinforcing echelons of the Warsaw Pact forces before they cross the inter-German border and to seize the initiative early through defensive counterattacks against Pact forces on NATO territory.

THE SOVIET-WARSAW PACT ACHILLES HEEL?

The success of a massive Soviet blitzkrieg against Europe would be critically dependent upon maintaining the momentum of the "high tempo" of advance called for in Soviet theater doctrine in the face of potentially heavy losses. The Soviet buildup itself has been crafted to further this Kremlin military tactic of attacking in wave after wave after wave of powerful forces designed to break through NATO's forward defenses at points of Soviet choosing. Soviet military strategy essentially seeks to play offense in a football game with Soviet rules, so that many fullbacks can charge the defensive line one after another over the same position on the premise that sooner or later some fullbacks will get through. In effect, the Soviets intend to "pile on" successive echelons of forces, at a rate that permits rapid replacement of losses and insures a swift victory by keeping defending NATO forces continually off balance. Soviet success is clearly contingent on the arrival intact, and at the right time and place, of these Soviet echelons. NATO must change the rules of the game to prevent this possibility.

According to a recent U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command analysis:

> The Armies of the Warsaw Pact are one of the largest and most powerful in history. They may also be one of the most cumbersome. The Warsaw Pact organizes, plans, and trains to conduct its version of the blitzkrieg. Against this, a linear defensive doctrine which is designed to prevent breakthrough by means of battles of attrition against a vastly superior force and ignores the operational goals is militarily unsound.

The proposed new "Airland Battle" doctrine assumes that Soviet conventional military posture and doctrine has significant inherent weaknesses, if NATO can exploit them. If NATO succeeds in isolating the attacking first echelon from the reinforcing echelons—through attacks on the latter—the momentum of the invasion would be destroyed, and, with it, any reasonable prospect of an irreparable and strategically decisive Soviet penetration of Western Europe.

It is this Soviet momentum that the new Army doctrine seeks to halt by destroying or disrupting follow-on Soviet echelons before they reach NATO territory, and by launching early counterattacks against isolated first echelon forces inside Western Europe. This is a dramatic departure from the comparative passivity of NATO's present Maginot-minded forward defense.

NEW TECHNOLOGY AND NEW DOCTRINE—NATO OPPORTUNITY

Not only the U.S. Army, but other knowledgeable experts believe that this new echelon-targeting doctrine, if adopted and implemented by the Alliance, has the potential to enhance conventional deterrence, raise the nuclear threshold, and put a new meaning into the strategy of forward defense. The doctrine capitalizes on three major advances in conventional weapons technology which have already taken place:

(1) The substantially improved lethality of conventional weapons carrying improved munitions that can be delivered from existing platforms;

(2) The great potential of micro-electronics to enhance the front-line units' ability quickly to collect, handle, distribute, and act on information about the enemy; and

(3) Improvements in the ability to quickly move and target large amounts of improved conventional firepower against enemy force concentrations.

It is neither possible nor necessary to match Soviet ground and tactical air forces on a one-for-one basis. The political and fiscal impossibility of attempting to compete with the Warsaw Pact numerically was vividly demonstrated in the 1952 Lisbon Conference. That NATO Summit recommended 96 divisions and 9,000 airplanes for the conventional defense of Western Europe. This recommendation was unacceptable to member nations then and remains so today given current NATO central region force levels of 26 divisions and 1,800 combat airplanes.

Instead, NATO needs to procure conventional weapons that can be delivered by existing aircraft and surface-to-surface rockets accurately against fixed and mobile forces. Long-range conventional weapons are being developed that, because of their greatly improved accuracy, now begin to approach the destructive potential of small yield (2 to 3 kt) battlefield nuclear weapons. Experts such as Dr. Joseph Braddock, Mr. Donald R. Cotter and Dr. Fred Wikner have conducted an impressive evaluation of the potential for improving conventional forward defense with these weapons. Some examples of such systems are the conventional-standoff weapon, the Corps support weapon system, and conventional anti-airfield missiles. According to these experts, these new conventional weapon systems can singly destroy 60 percent or more of an entire company of tanks or motorized infantry per aircraft sortie or missile fired.

CAN NEW DOCTRINE CHANGE OLD PROCUREMENT HABITS?

If this new doctrine is adopted, a major unresolved issue is how the political and military leaders of each NATO country can get the procurement bureaucracies of their respective defense departments to purchase the appropriate weapons for their individual ground and air forces. With limited budgets this task will not be easy. Military institutions, traditional and conservative by nature, will adopt these weapons only with the most careful and intelligent encouragement. They may be reluctant to trade off even a small part of their proposed new acquisitions (tanks, planes, etc.) in return for much more capable weapons and munitions as well as targeting and surveillance systems. The U.S. Army believes that certain parts of the "Airland Battle"

doctrine can be adopted without major changes in force structure and equipment, and that these partial changes would lead to a significant improvement in NATO's ability to contain a Warsaw Pact breakthrough and to inflict higher losses on attacking forces. Budget reality will require, however, that there be some trade-offs between traditional platforms (such as tanks and aircraft) and advanced weapons, if this theory is to be fully implemented.

A COMPATIBLE EUROPEAN IDEA

As the U.S. Army moves toward a conventional defense based on "fire and maneuver" and early attacks on the enemy's rear echelons, some Europeans are discussing a defense in depth based upon re-equipped and expanded reserves and territorial forces. Europe has large reservoirs of trained manpower not organized into standing reserve units. If organized into units and properly equipped, such forces could become a threat to Soviet ability to hold any territory they might initially be able to capture.

The U.S. Army's concept is aimed at early containment of a Soviet breakthrough by attacking their rear echelons before they can cross the border. A compatible idea, now gaining ground in European military circles, is to focus on attacking those Soviet units that have already crossed. Both concepts have merit, particularly if applied simultaneously and in a coordinated fashion. These are new concepts, however, and there is far from a consensus in NATO. German and British Army leaders have indicated interest in these new concepts, but as yet they have not received the attention of the top NATO political leadership that they deserve.

THE BALL IS IN THE COURT OF THE POLITICAL LEADERS

For years political leaders who support NATO have despaired at the inability of NATO's military leaders to outline a conventional doctrine that appears achievable within politically available resources.

For the first time NATO's military leadership is beginning to outline this very possibility. Unfortunately, NATO's political leadership seems to be in a trance. While there may be problems in these proposals, the potential payoff demands they be given immediate top level study. NATO countries must not allow the possibility of a real conventional defense and deterrence to pass by without serious and immediate consideration.

IS A CREDIBLE CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE AFFORDABLE?

It seems clear that NATO defense budgets cannot be reduced if we are even to preserve current defense capabilities. It also seems clear that few NATO members are likely to increase their defense budgets substantially as long as the present political and economic climate within the Alliance prevails. On the other hand, substantial increases beyond those NATO has already agreed on may not be necessary if the Alliance is prepared to undertake fundamental changes in its force posture, its doctrine, and its procurement practices.

NATO countries have committed themselves to 3 percent annual real growth in defense spending with varying degrees of success in

meeting these goals. Recently, General Rogers told NATO Defense Ministers that "attaining an adequate conventional capability is feasible at levels of national defense expenditure which are not as great as most imagine." General Rogers has made force proposals for 1983 to 1988 which he says "would require an annual real increase in defense spending of 4 percent Alliance-wide."

These proposals lay a foundation for a new NATO force posture and conventional doctrine. Admittedly they represent only the first steps toward implementing the new strategic concepts that are required, but they are bold proposals indeed, considering NATO's historic tendency to cling to the status quo. Many of the new efforts do not require additional money, but instead focus on reorganization and revitalized strategic and tactical doctrine. The primary cost of such changes would be in shattered preconceptions and broken traditions.

Last year, NATO was close to meeting the spending goal outlined by General Rogers. It would be tragic if NATO political leaders continue to ignore the hope of a renewed and real conventional deterrent.

INTEGRATION AND INTEROPERABILITY ARE INDISPENSABLE

NATO integration and interoperability are the keys to implementing any new doctrine successfully in Central Europe as the following Department of Defense chart demonstrates.

CHART C-12

COMPARISON OF NATO AND WARSAW PACT TOTAL DEFENSE COSTS



[1]SOUTHEAST ASIA INCREMENT EXCLUDED (I.E., VIETNAM COSTS)

NOTE.—From the Department of Defense Annual Report fiscal year 1982.

This chart clearly shows that the United States and its NATO Allies spend more for defense than the Kremlin and its Warsaw Pact Allies. These figures include the funds for all U.S. forces and all Soviet forces, including those along the Chinese border and in Afghanistan.

NATO-WARSAW PACT MILITARY BALANCE—WHERE DOES THE MONEY GO?

A recent DOD assessment provided in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee NATO Report gives the Warsaw Pact a "2 to 1 advantage across the entire central front," when comparing "total firepower capability." NATO has just released a comprehensive comparison of the NATO-Pact balance which documents the large Warsaw Pact numerical advantages in combat power.

The taxpayers in every NATO country should question why the Warsaw Pact is credited with substantially more conventional military capability than NATO when NATO spends more money. Some of the answer lies in the Pact's comparatively low military manpower costs, but a large part of the combat imbalance lies in the Pact's greater degree of force integration and commonality in weaponry and tactics.

The present NATO armaments system functions as little more than a loosely organized collection of national defense efforts, backed by fragmented and highly inefficient national procurement systems. The North Atlantic democracies possess more than half again as many people as the Warsaw Pact countries and more than twice the gross national product of the Warsaw Pact countries. In spite of these advantages, the loosely organized NATO defense efforts produce a collection of forces that are quantitatively inferior, qualitatively uneven, and have only a limited ability to rearm, repair, reinforce, support, supply or even communicate with one another. No less disturbing are the wide disparities in national ammunition stockpiles which call into question NATO's ability to sustain combat beyond the first weeks of hostilities. The U.S. Senate has passed a resolution introduced by Senator Roth, Senator Glenn and myself suggesting ways to improve Alliance cooperation in this area.

THE U.S. EXAMPLE

In our own Department of Defense, there is today no high level person working full time on these important Alliance cooperation issues. It is not until you reach down in the bureauracy to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for NATO Affairs level that anyone is identified for this focus. This position has been vacant for over a year.

THE U.S. ARMY CANNOT MARCH ALONE

A common military doctrine and operational tactics for all NATO forces are a prerequisite to any credible conventional defense. There is no point in the U.S. Army adopting a new posture if the Allies on our Army's flanks continue to adhere to traditional NATO doctrines. Furthermore, to implement this new doctrine, the integration of air

support with ground action is ever more necessary than before. Integration and interoperability can produce quantum jumps in military effectiveness, but this type cooperation continues to elude NATO leadership. National military traditions and inter-service customs have for years sapped NATO's resources and strength.

THE SACRED COWS

This new conventional doctrine may offer the possibility of real conventional defense within affordable defense budgets, but a revitalized political and military leadership will be required to implement it successfully. The top political and military leaders of Europe and the United States will have to take conventional defense seriously and support the appropriate improvements fully—even at the cost of some national traditions and inter-service customs. If this is a price that NATO nations refuse to pay, it is doubtful that the people of the United States or Europe will continue to support the current NATO posture for very much longer.

GROWING NUCLEAR CONTROVERSY

Within the past few years, NATO's nuclear posture has become a focus of growing public controversy. Actual NATO deployment of Pershing-II ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe, absent an arms control agreement with the Soviets, is given no better than a 50–50 chance of success by many knowledgeable Europeans. 1981 and 1982 have witnessed major public demonstrations in Europe against the deployment of modern nuclear missiles. President Reagan's call for the "zero option"—no long-range theater missiles on either side—temporarily stilled the voices of the European anti-nuclear movement, but now a nuclear freeze movement has gained considerable attention in the United States. The administration opposes a nuclear freeze at current levels on the grounds that it would "perpetuate an unstable and unequal military balance."

THE BUNDY/KENNAN/MC NAMARA/SMITH PROPOSAL

Four former U.S. policymakers—McGeorge Bundy, George F. Kennan, Robert S. McNamara, and Gerard Smith—have called for a "no-first-use policy" to be adopted by NATO. This would limit NATO's use of nuclear weapons to retaliation for Soviet first use; it would ban NATO first use, even in the event of a collapse of NATO's conventional defenses. Secretary of State Haig has publicly expressed administration opposition to this policy on the grounds that it would make "Europe safe for conventional aggression" in the absence of the United States taking steps to "reintroduce the draft, triple the size of its Armed Forces, and put its economy on a wartime footing."

The growing clamor and controversy surrounding nuclear weapons represents a volatile political situation. The political leadership of the United States and the NATO allies must assert vigorous leadership in presenting their constituents with the real choices and trade-offs regarding NATO's nuclear weapons policy. The challenge for NATO's political leaders is to channel the growing concerns and fears into posi-

tive support for constructive changes to NATO's conventional and nuclear policies which can significantly raise the nuclear threshold.

IS "NO FIRST USE" A RESPONSIBLE NATO POSTURE?

NATO conventional force strategy is based on the possible first use of nuclear weapons. NATO's conventional warfighting tactics, like those of the Soviet Army, reflect the presence and possible use of nuclear weapons on the battlefield. In the pre-nuclear era, concentration of ground forces on the battlefield was common practice to achieve a decisive breakthrough of a defender's line.

In the presence of nuclear weapons, however, prolonged concentrations of conventional forces are potentially fatal because massed forces present lucrative targets that are easily destroyed by nuclear weapons. Thus conventional tactics against a nuclear armed opponent place a premium on keeping ground forces dispersed.

In this regard, NATO's deployment of varied battlefield and theater weapons in Europe and NATO's first use doctrine denies to attacking Soviet conventional forces the ability to mass their tank armies for long periods. Because of this nuclear influence on conventional warfare tactics, a NATO "no first use policy" standing alone would allow a Soviet concentration of forces and would undermine NATO's conventional defenses. The Alliance must carefully consider the effect of its theater nuclear policy on Soviet conventional capabilities before any major changes are made in NATO's theater nuclear doctrine and deployment.

MAJOR CHANGES IN NUCLEAR POSTURE NEEDED

NATO's nuclear force posture, especially its heavy reliance on short-range battlefield systems, requires significant reform. NATO's nuclear forces include many weapons that are too short in range and are not survivable. In the early stages of a war in Central Europe, NATO would be placed in an unacceptable position of "using or losing" its short-range battlefield systems. If the weapons are moved to the rear, NATO would then confront the dilemma of employing nuclear weapons whose range restricts them to use on NATO territory, thus destroying the land we are sworn to protect. The security of these weapons and their warheads is a big problem and detracts from conventional force capabilities by requiring substantial manpower for management, maintenance, and security. Given this situation, many who have studied NATO's nuclear posture for years wonder why the anti-nuclear movement is protesting against the proposed NATO long-range nuclear weapons rather than against the battlefield systems that represent the status quo.

THE CONVENTIONAL HORSE MUST BE IN FRONT OF THE NUCLEAR CART

I differ with Messrs. Bundy, Kennan, McNamara, and Smith in that I believe that a viable conventional defense, together with mutual arms control guarantees, should be pre-conditions to any move toward a no first use policy. Simply declaring a no first use policy in the hope of stimulating greater investment in conventional defense will not suffice. The conventional horse must be in front of the nuclear cart.

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If NATO is willing to dedicate itself to creating a credible conventional defense, it can also undertake other measures that would significantly reduce the likelihood of nuclear war in Europe. A viable new NATO conventional capability would:

(1) Provide a rational basis for a radical transformation in NATO's present nuclear force posture and a negotiated withdrawal from Europe of several thousand of the battlefield nuclear warheads now deployed there;

(2) Permit modernization of NATO's nuclear forces at much lower levels of nuclear weapons than exist today. Some additional medium- and long-range nuclear weapons for deterrence, such as nuclear-armed submarine-launched cruise missiles deployed on our attack submarines, should be considered for NATO's long-term deterrent posture;

(3) Put conventional defense and deterrence on a far firmer footing and focus our nuclear policy on the deterrence of any Soviet use of nuclear weapons; and

(4) Provide one of the necessary pre-conditions to serious NATO consideration of a policy of "no first use" of nuclear weapons.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The NATO Alliance has weathered many military and political storms in the three decades of successful deterrence of Soviet aggression in Central Europe. The accumulative effect of these storms, however, coupled with changes in the military balance of power, have greatly weakened the NATO shield of Western values and interests.

NATO is at a critical juncture. It can continue doing business as usual by clinging to the status quo. This will inevitably lead to reduced NATO credibility and a deterioration of the Alliance.

There is another available path. NATO should commit itself to achieving a viable conventional defense, a revised nuclear posture and a series of bold and innovative arms control propoals that would make possible a significant reduction of battlefield nuclear weapons in Europe.

It is apparent that President Reagan and his NATO counterparts will have much to discuss in the June NATO Summit. Strong American and European leadership—pulling together—will be required to make a realistic conventional defense of Europe possible and to move away from NATO's excessive reliance on early use of nuclear weapons.

If these goals are to become realities, I recommend the following:

I. President Reagan should be prepared to offer a proposal at the June NATO Summit that will challenge the Alliance to dedicate its maximum effort to building a credible conventional defense and an improved and more sensible nuclear deterrent.

President Reagan should challenge our Department of Defense to be prepared to present to NATO a plan for a coherent military strategy for the security of NATO, together with a reallocation of roles, missions, forces and resources to implement it. Much of this information is already available through existing comprehensive defense studies but simply has not been focused on by most top military and civilian leaders. Our Department of Defense should answer the following

questions for President Reagan before he meets with his NATO counterparts:

A. How can NATO military doctrine be changed to substantially improve the chances of successful conventional defense?

B. Is the "Airland Battle" concept official Department of Defense doctrine? If so:

1. Has this new doctrine been proposed by the United States to NATO?

2. How can NATO forces be operationally integrated to implement this doctrine?

3. What programmatic changes are necessary to underwrite this capability?

4. What conventional programs and weapons are in the current budgets and five-year plan to enhance the disruption and destruction of Soviet follow-on echelons?

5. What new weapons or systems are available for this purpose which are not in the current budgets or five-year plan?

C. What opportunities exist to improve NATO conventional defense through improved use of European manpower reserves, organized and equipped for territorial defense?

D. If a viable conventional defense is achieved, how should NATO theater nuclear forces be redesigned and modernized to:

1. Better deter Soviet first use of nuclear weapons;

2. Enhance conventional defense; and

3. Provide options for major negotiated withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Europe?

II. Once firmly embarked on the implementation of a viable conventional defense, NATO can:

A. Propose a mutual U.S./U.S.S.R. negotiated withdrawal of several thousand battlefield nuclear weapons from Central Europe.

B. Seriously consider two joint and mutually dependent NATO-Warsaw Pact arms control pledges of:

1. No first use of nuclear weapons; and

2. No large concentrations of conventional ground forces, with special emphasis on armor forces, within a specified distance of the inter-German border: (a) A breach of the "conventional concentration pledge" would render null and void the no first use pledge; (b) The effective date of any such arms control proposal must be geared to the implementation of a viable NATO conventional defense; and (c) Any such arms control agreement must be verifiable.

III. Until the Alliance agrees on a new doctrine and dedicates itself to its implementation, President Reagan should instruct the Secretary of Defense to permit no net increase in the present number of U.S. troops deployed in Europe.

The President should also ask the Secretary of Defense to examine the five-year defense plan, and beginning in fiscal year 1984, to isolate the expenditures designed directly for NATO improvements and freeze those expenditures which exceed our NATO 3-percent commitment until the NATO political leaders have a clear agreement on a military strategy for the decade of the eighties.

IV. NATO leaders should agree to put their full weight behind renewed and vigorous efforts—including new or revised high level NATO and Defense Department groups if necessary—to accomplish the following objectives within specified deadlines:

A. Establish a cooperative defense-industrial effort within Europe and between Europe and North America;

B. Develop options for specialization and division of labor within the Alliance to share, equitably and efficiently, the financial burden as well as the economic benefits of NATO defense;

C. Promote increased integration and interoperability of NATO forces;

D. Identify weapon systems which can be standardized at an early stage of R. & D. and procurement; and

E. Monitor each NATO nation's defense budget at every stage of the budget process, providing information to NATO governments as to compliance with two-way street and standardization agreements.

V. NATO should agree to use Western financial leverage, such as credits and taxes, to influence Soviet behavior, while sharing the burden among NATO's members.

A standing group in NATO whose primary function would be to monitor all Western credits to the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact and keep the leaders informed of current developments and long-range trends could be a first step. This group would also be responsible for suggesting options on a continuing basis for reduction or suspension of these credits and other financial measures, in response to NATO collective decisions.

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